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bstract
The objective of this overview paper is to address some key issues affecting the stability of financial institutions. The emphasis is on the micro-
conomics of banking: what type of incentives do financial institutions have in the current landscape? And what does this imply for regulation and
upervision? The paper is motivated by the proliferation of financial innovations and their impact on the financial services industry. A fundamental
eature of more recent financial innovations is their focus on augmenting marketability. Marketability has led to a strong growth of transaction-
riented banking (trading and financial market activities). This is at least in part facilitated by the scalability of this activity (contrary to relationship
anking activities). It is argued that the more intertwined nature of banks and financial markets induces opportunistic decision making and herding
ehavior. In doing so, it has exposed banks to the boom and bust nature of financial markets and has augmented instability.
Building on this, the paper discusses the incentives of individual financial institutions. Issues addressed include: frictions between relationship
anking and transaction activities that are more financial market focused, ownership structure issues, the impact of the cost of capital, the effectiveness
f market discipline, and what configuration of the industry can be expected. We will argue that market forces might be at odds with financial
tability. We will point at institutional and regulatory changes that might be needed to deal with the complexity of financial institutions.
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. Introduction
The financial services sector has gone through an unprece-
ented turmoil in the last few years. Stability is a paramount
oncern. The institutional and regulatory framework has been
alled in question. This paper seeks to build an understanding
bout the fundamental forces that may have destabilized bank-
ng. We focus in particular on the effects of recent financial
nnovations and their impact on the decision making of financial
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mnstitutions. The emphasis is therefore on the micro-economics
f banking: what type of incentives do financial institutions have
n the current landscape? And what implications can be drawn
or the desired regulatory and supervisory structure of banking?
The financial crisis followed a period with substantial
hanges in the industry. Liberalization, deregulation and
dvances in information technology had reshaped the financial
andscape dramatically. Interbank competition has heated up and
anks face increasing competition from non-banking financial
nstitutions and the financial markets. The predictability of the
ndustry with low levels of financial innovation, little innovation
n distribution channels and well defined and rigid institutional
tructures is gone. Product innovations, new distribution chan-
els and emerging new competitors are in abundance. While
he crisis itself and the regulatory responses may have – tem-
orarily – halted the ongoing dynamic shifts in the industry, the
nderlying structural changes have not disappeared.
This paper will focus on the structure of the banking indus-
ry, particularly the complexity of financial institutions. The
tarting point is that more recent financial innovations have
omplicated the governance of financial institutions by creat-
ng a dynamism that is hard to control. A fundamental feature of
ecent financial innovations is that they are often aimed at aug-
enting marketability, see for example securitization and related
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roducts like CDS and CDOs. Such marketability can augment
iversification opportunities, yet as we will argue can also cre-
te instability. The mere fact that something becomes tradable
or marketable – we will use these terms interchangeably) can
ndermine commitment. For example, as is well known, mort-
ages that become tradable might undermine the incentives of
he originator to monitor the quality of borrowers. More fun-
amentally, when markets exist for all kinds of real or financial
ssets of a firm, a firm can more easily change the direction of its
trategy. This might be good, but could also lead to lack of com-
itment (and staying power), more impulsive decisions and pos-
ibly herding. The latter refers to the tendency to follow current
ads. In banking, herding is particularly worrisome because it
ould create systemic risk. Meaning, when all institutions make
he same bets, risk exposures become more highly correlated and
simultaneous failure of institutions might become more likely.1
Some have described recent developments as banks “fighting
or turf” in the face of market liberalization and/or major tech-
ological shifts (Hellwig, 2008). That is, major structural shifts
e.g. the financial innovation wave as a reflection of develop-
ents in information technology?) open up the industry and
ould induce parties to grab market share in order to estab-
ish a leading position going forward. This would point at a
ore transitory problem. As with for example the banking cri-
is following the deregulation of Swedish banking in the 80s, it
akes some time for the industry to settle in a new equilibrium
following liberalization and/or other major shifts) and in the
ean time accidents may happen. We believe more is going on.
he increased marketability is a permanent shift in the under-
ying dynamics of financial institutions, and has increased the
ensitivity of banks to financial market developments.
As we will argue, this more intertwined nature of banks and
nancial markets has exposed banks to the boom and bust nature
f financial markets and may have augmented instability.2 The
inkages to the financial market also facilitate a further prolif-
ration of transaction-oriented banking (trading and financial
arket) activities possibly at the expense of more traditional
elationship banking activities. Important is also the scalability
f transaction-oriented banking relative to relationship banking
ctivities, and hence the more opportunistic approach that this
acilitates in transaction banking. What this points at is that banks
an relatively easily participate in the proliferation of financial
1 Risk taking might also become more cyclical. For example, the demand for
enior tranches in securitized structures was high despite their high sensitivity
o bad economic states (Coval et al., 2009). Investors were either lured by high
atings of such instruments or, alternatively, they were eager to upload systemic
isk. And this was an industry wide phenomenon. Haensel and Krahnen (2007)
how on a data set of European CDOs that banks that issued CDOs raised their
ystemic risk.
2 As Shin (2009, p. 110) puts it, “. . . in a modern market-based financial sys-
em, banking and capital market conditions should not be viewed in isolation.”
emirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) point at the risks of collective euphoria,
nd that with the length of an economic boom a crisis becomes (ultimately) more
ikely (see also Llewellyn, 2010; Woolley, 2010). Adrian and Shin (2010) point
t the effect of favorable financial market conditions on leverage (increasing)
nd funding (becoming more fragile and short-term). Both effects cause stress
hen market conditions deteriorate.
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arkets. This has further fuelled the sensitivity of banks to finan-
ial markets. We will also argue that via an increased risk profile
his may undermine a bank’s relationship banking franchise.
In this context also the ownership structure of banks is
mportant. The traditional partnership model in investment
anking may have contained risk taking in that partners had
heir personal wealth tied up in the business, and could not
asily leave and liquefy their ownership claim. In a sense, the
arketability of their own involvement (human capital) was
everely constrained which may have countered the fluidity of
anking activities itself.
The increasingly fluid and complex nature of the banking
ndustry – via speed of change, interconnectedness and the pres-
nce of large and complex institutions – has motivated some to
oint at the importance of market discipline in banking as a sup-
lement to regulatory and supervisory controls (Flannery, 2009).
e will argue that market discipline might not be able to play an
mportant role in ensuring stability of the financial system as a
hole. The momentum-driven nature of financial markets might
ean that the risk in whatever activity that is ‘hot’ is effectively
nderestimated by the market as a whole, and this may ‘poison’
arket discipline. That is, momentum driven financial markets
romote certain strategies, and these very same markets would
hen not be in a good position to impose market discipline. To
he contrary, they were actually encouraging those strategies by
ossibly underpricing the risks involved.
From here, the question is how the financial sector will
evelop. This paper emphasizes the importance of understanding
he economics of banking for assessing the changes in the indus-
ry. Can we draw insights from the extensive literature on scale
nd scope economies in banking? We will argue that only lim-
ted insights are available. Most recent empirical work identifies
ome scale economies, yet faces bigger difficulties in identifying
eal scope advantages. Thus overwhelming evidence is missing,
lbeit there continues to be a clear tendency with financial insti-
utions to go for growth and larger size. While recently most
nstitutions have expressed a ‘client centric’ strategy, by some
alled ‘back-to-basics’ (e.g. the Dutch banking conglomerate
NG), the underlying forces in banking may not have changed, so
t is far from clear what this sudden emphasis on ‘client centric’
nd ‘back-to-basics’ strategies really means.
This picture suggests that endogenous developments in the
ndustry itself may not lead to less complex institutions. The
mportant question then is how to deal with this complexity. Here
e will point at institutional and regulatory changes that might
e needed to improve the stability of the financial sector. One
ould say that the institutional structure (including regulation)
as not kept up with the enhanced marketability, ‘change-
bility’ and hence complexity of the industry. We will focus
n effective supervision of individual financial institutions,
lbeit in the context of the macro-prudential (system-wide, i.e.
nterconnectedness) concerns that are paramount. Dealing with
he complexity of individual institutions via timely intervention
nd orderly resolution is important in this context. What does
his mean? Are structural measures (e.g. breaking up large
nd complex institutions) needed to deal with the complexity?
e will argue that imposing structural measures is far from
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might be the Dutch or UK market for life insurance products.
On several occasions structural misselling has occurred with as
a common denominator the presence of an excessive variety of
definition value enhancing. Elul (1995) shows that adding a new security could
have “almost arbitrary effects on agents’ utilities.”
4 If certain frictions – transaction costs – impede the optimal allocation of cap-
ital then innovations that reduce these seem optimal (see Tufano, 2003). In this
positive interpretation, innovations like credit default swaps (CDS) and collat-
eralized debt obligations (CDO) would promote an optimal allocation of capital
by reducing the cost of diversifying and reallocating risk. However, as Posen and
Hinterschweiger (2009) note, during the period 2003–2008 the growth in OTC
derivatives outpaced that of real investment by a factor of twelve (300% versus
25%). And after 2006 real investments stagnated while OTC derivatives grew
arguably faster than ever. While this does not preclude that the proliferation of
these financial instruments provided benefits also later in the boom, the negative
effects on the robustness of the financial system – as observed in 2007–2009 –
tend to refute this.
5A.W.A. Boot / Review of Devel
traightforward but might be needed to help contain possibly
estabilizing market forces and improve the effectiveness of
upervision. Overall we advocate a comprehensive approach to
egulation and supervision.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Financial innova-
ions and their impact on marketability are analyzed in Section
. Section 3 analyzes the banks’ choices between relationship
anking and more financial market driven transaction banking,
ncluding the potential internal frictions between those activities.
ypically this is framed in the context of commercial versus
nvestment banking activities, but this might be too simplis-
ic. Much of investment banking is relationship based. The key
imension is the link to financial markets and that is more domi-
ant for transaction-based activities. Section 4 briefly addresses
he banks’ cost of capital. This issue is important both internally
cross activities (how to allocate capital among activities?) and
rom an overall perspective (how much capital is needed, and
s bank capital ‘expensive’?). The perceptions about the cost of
apital and its determinants are important for understanding the
ecision making and choices of banks. In Section 5 we focus
n the ownership structure of banks. Particularly, we discuss the
artnership structure as an example of an ownership structure
hat better aligns incentives, and might have stabilized invest-
ent banking in the past. Section 6 considers market discipline.
ould it be effective in constraining bank risk choices and help
n augmenting stability? As stated earlier, we are rather skepti-
al. In Section 7 we focus on bank strategies, scale and scope
conomies, and the complexity of financial institutions that may
ndogenously come about. Section 8 asks the question what
an be done about complexity, and analyzes whether structural
easures are desirable. Section 9 concludes.
. Financial innovations and marketability
The notion that financial innovation is good for economic
rowth is based on the idea that such innovations will improve
he allocation of capital. In the words of Fed Chairman Ben
ernanke, “The increasing sophistication and depth of finan-
ial markets promote economic growth by allocating capital
here it can be most productive” (Bernanke, 2007). This sounds
olitically correct, and by its very generality is difficult to
efute. However, more specificity is needed. What can pre-
isely be good about financial innovations? In a first best world
here information is available to all and everybody is capable
f fully discerning all relevant attributes, financial innovations
ould help complete the market, i.e. facilitate a complete set
f Arrow-Debreu securities. This is the typical ‘spanning’ argu-
ent; financial innovations are good because they help complete
he market.3
3 A complete market means that investors or consumers can ‘contract’ on any
onceivable future state of the world, and in doing so create an optimal allocation.
n the context of hedging for example such a complete market allows investors
o neutralize whatever state-contingent risk they may face. What this means is
hat investors can tailor the state-dependent pay-offs to their precise preferences.
lease note that one cannot automatically assume that introducing new securities
n incomplete markets that give investors greater ‘spanning’ opportunities is by
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As a corollary, financial innovations might then help improve
he allocation of capital. In more simple terms, a complete mar-
et allows individuals to optimally hedge, c.q. smooth, their
ncome over time. Given the higher level of predictability that
esults, they can abscond of their money for longer periods of
ime facilitating more long-term investments. Similarly, the trad-
bility (marketability) of debt and equity in financial markets
llows investors to liquefy their holdings at any point in time
i.e. by selling their holdings to other investors) and helps in
iversifying risks. In doing so firms might have an easier access
o long(er) term financing.
The wish to liquefy claims also helps explain the introduc-
ion of limited liability in equity-type contracts—an innovation
y itself. It facilitates trading, and allows investors to liq-
efy claims on otherwise long-term investments (Michalopoulos
t al., 2009). Liquidity therefore is valuable, yet, as we will see,
an simultaneously have some negative repercussions.4 More
pecifically, in a world with imperfections, agency and informa-
ion problems lead to potential distortions that can create a dark
ide of liquidity.
.1. Information problems
When information asymmetries are severe and particular con-
ingencies are not contractible at all, having complete markets is
nfeasible.5 This happens when contingencies are not verifiable,
nd/or too costly to verify. Introducing a financial innovation
ight now have a much darker motivation. Financial innova-
ions might be intended to fool market participants. An exampleNote that new securities are sometimes introduced to help overcome infor-
ation asymmetries. While not a really new security, a debt claim may illustrate
his. Such a claim might offer financing at lower cost than issuing equity because
t is less information sensitive (see Myers and Majluf, 1984; Hennessy, 2009).
he idea is that an equity type claim would suffer from a lemon problem, see
kerlof (1970). Alternatively, in case of verification problems, the anticipated
osts of verification with a debt contract are limited since in most cases the firm
an and will repay (and no verification is needed, see the earlier contribution of
ale and Hellwig, 1984; Tirole, 2006). The security design literature provides
everal other examples, e.g. convertible bonds could give bondholders protec-
ion against risk-seeking behavior by shareholders. Others have argued that a
ights issue could help solve the lemon problem (Heinkel and Schwartz, 1986;
alachandran et al., 2008).
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As we will discuss, the instability in the industry might not be
easy to resolve, and more structural measures might be needed.
9 Also replacing deposit funding by wholesale funding exposed banks to addi-
tional liquidity risk. Huang and Ratnovski (2011) show that the dark side of
liquidity comes in the form of reduced incentives of wholesale funds providers to
monitor their banks and this may trigger inefficient liquidation; see also Acharya
et al. (forthcoming). The main threat of a bank run may no longer come from
demand deposits as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) but rather from wholesale
financiers or from bank borrowers that deplete their loan commitments (see
Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Gatev et al., 2009).
10 This discussion is also related to the general corporate governance question70 A.W.A. Boot / Review of Devel
roduct innovations that share one characteristic: complexity in
onjunction with obscurity of costs.6
Financial innovations would then tend to worsen the alloca-
ion of capital. The more recent advances in securitization could
e interpreted in that way too. Initially securitization could have
llowed for a wider access to investors, reduced funding costs
nd hence improved lending opportunities for banks. As stated
arlier, this may well have been value enhancing. There is a logic
n fulfilling the demand for high grade securities by packaging
ortgages, and selling the low risk portion to (distant) investors.
s long as the originators of the loans keep the more risky layer,
hey would still have a strong incentive to screen loan applicants
nd monitor them.
What happened subsequently is less benign. It is clear that
ending standards weakened (Keys et al., 2010).7 In part this
ad little to do with securitization. The housing boom in the
S seduced lenders in granting higher mortgages. As long as
rices kept rising, loans could always be refinanced and/or sales
f underlying houses would cover the outstanding mortgages.
here securitization did come into the picture is that the insa-
iable appetite for triple-A paper in the market pushed financial
nstitutions into a high gear repacking mode, ultimately lower-
ng standards. Also, in a desire to issue as much triple-A paper
s possible, the more risky tranches of securitization structures
ere repackaged again, and more triple-A paper was squeezed
ut. This packaging and repackaging led to very complicated
ecurities. When the market finally started questioning the sus-
ainability of the housing boom, the arcane securities were
uddenly out of favor.8
The more fundamental observation, and one that is particu-
arly important for this paper, is that securitization interconnects
anks with financial markets. Securitization was not just there
o offload risk, but banks also took positions in those instru-
ents (via liquidity guarantees, warehousing, etc.). Hence their
ortunes became intertwined with those of the financial markets.
.2. Marketability and excessive ‘changeability’ keySecuritization has opened up the bank balance sheet.
any bank assets have potentially become marketable. This
6 Gabaix and Laibson (2006) analyze how producers (e.g. financial services
rms) can exploit uniformed consumers by misrepresenting attributes. In Carlin
2009) complexity is added to discourage information production, intended to
acilitate expropriation of investors. Henderson and Pearson (2009) show how
nnovations might be designed to fool market participants, and in doing so cause
erious harm.
7 Parlour and Plantin (2008) analyze loan sales. In their view banks weigh the
enefits of loan sales in the form of additional flexibility to quickly redeploy
ank capital against the drawbacks in the form of lower monitoring incentives.
hey show that loan sales would lead to excessive trading of highly rated secu-
ities but to insufficient liquidity in low rated securities. Risk weighted capital
equirements may help in bringing liquidity to low rated securities.
8 As long as the momentum was there, the market’s appetite could not be sat-
rated, and much money could be made by putting the ‘repackaging machines’
nto higher and higher gear. The willingness of rating agencies to grant high rat-
ngs did clearly help (see also White, 2010). In the process, financial institutions
dapted their business mix to these market linked activities.
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arketability is typically seen as something positive, but the
inks with the financial markets that this has created has made
anks potentially more vulnerable vis-à-vis the volatility and
omentum in financial markets. Moreover, marketability
eans that existing activities and risks can be changed almost
nstantaneously. Since financial markets go through cycles and
re possibly subjected to hypes and investor sentiments, the
anks’ decisions might become more momentum driven, or as
urner (2010) puts it, banks become “. . . even more suscep-
ible to self reinforcing exuberant upswings and subsequent
ownswings. . .”; see also Shleifer and Vishny (2010). This
dds further instability.9 What we mean by this is that due to the
roliferation of financial markets and the increased marketabil-
ty of the banks’ assets, banks become more opportunistic and
ould lose a degree of stability.10
With information technology as a driving force, the pro-
iferation of financial markets together with the marketability
nhancing financial innovations have changed the dynamics of
anking. We will argue that more is going on than just typical
ompetitive dynamics where structural shifts (e.g. liberalization)
ave opened up ‘the market’ and parties scramble for mar-
et share to establish a leading position going forward. While
uch upheaval might induce risky behavior and cause temporary
nstability,11 we expect a more permanent effect of the prolifera-
ion of the recent marketability enhancing financial innovations.n the rights of shareholders in the financial market. In related work by Boot
t al. (2008), the emphasis is on the need of having some stable shareholders.
he liquidity stock markets provide may cause ownership to be changing all the
ime such that no stable and lasting link with shareholders comes about. Support
nd commitment to a particular strategy might then become weaker and more
aphazard. This could make firms more sensitive to short term financial market
ressures. Bhide (1993) argues that the liquidity of stock markets may have a
ark side in that fully liquid stock markets encourage diffuse ownership, and this
ay undermine monitoring incentives. Hence corporate control over managers
ight be lax. Monitoring incentives typically require a large(r) and enduring
take in a company, yet this is at odds with liquidity. Bolton and von Thadden
1998) have shown that overall stock market liquidity may actually benefit from
he simultaneous presence of a few block holders. The dark side of liquidity and
ossibility for quick changes in asset allocation is related to the work of Myers
nd Rajan (1998) who emphasize that the illiquidity of bank assets serves a
seful purpose in that it reduces asset substitution moral hazard. The dark side
f marketability is also present in the work in economics that emphasizes that
reating (interim) markets and trading opportunities might not necessarily be
ood, see for example the work of Jacklin (1987) in the context of Diamond and
ybvig’s (1983) intertemporal smoothing.
11 Hellwig (2008) points at the banking crisis that followed the deregulation
n 1971 in the UK (lifting of credit controls) as well as the crisis of 1992 that
ollowed deregulation in the mid-eighties in Sweden.
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This line of argument implies that the proprietary tradingA.W.A. Boot / Review of Devel
. Relationship-oriented versus transaction-based
anking
As The Economist put it over fifteen years ago in the context
f the experience of securities firms:
“Perhaps the worst feature of the 1980s – which has sub-
sequently returned to haunt the securities firms – was the
abandonment by most of them of the old relationships with
their customers. [. . .] “The aim was to do a deal, any deal”,
remembers one manager who prefers not to be named” (The
Economist, April 15 1995, Special Section: A Survey of Wall
Street, p. 13).
While this quote was made over fifteen years ago, it is inter-
sting to note that when financial markets prosper they appear to
ush financial institutions away from their relationship banking
ranchise. This might be even more true with the recent prolifer-
tion of financial markets where many banks actively engaged in
nancial market driven activities, including proprietary trading.
n Section 7 we will make some observations about the cur-
ent strategies of financial players where banks go out of their
ay to show support for customer-centric strategies. Our mes-
age will be somewhat skeptical. Banks appear to operate with
ncreasingly shorter cycles in which they drift away from (and
ediscover) the importance of their relationship banking fran-
hise. It was only in October 2005 that Citigroup felt compelled
o reemphasize the importance of its retail and relationship bank-
ng franchise by stating that Citi should think “locally.”12 And
arely five years later its CEO Vikram Pandit emphasizes that
iti should (again) position itself closer to the customer: “Serv-
ng customers, serving clients, serving the real economy, doing
hat is what banks should be doing”.13
Apparently in good years financial markets appear to offer
empting opportunities to financial players, regardless of the
rue capabilities that each of them might have. For example,
n 1999, ABNAMRO – which by now following a split up has
isappeared as an international group – unfolded a financial
arket oriented wholesale banking strategy, to change course
few years later realizing its true added value in relationship-
ased commercial banking. As BCG (2010a) puts it (explaining
he surge in transaction oriented activities in 2004–2007): “. . .
mid surging economies, low loan losses, and readily avail-
ble cheap capital, it did not really matter whether a bank had
op- or bottom-quartile capabilities [. . .]. All that mattered were
orkable sales processes”.
What this points at is the scalability of transaction-oriented
ctivities. Subject to available capital banks can quickly
ncrease their exposure to those activities. Relationship-based
ctivities are more constrained as they depend on employing
uman capital and engaging with potential clients. Thus
12
“Thinking Locally at Citigroup”, Business Week, October 24, 2005, pp.
0–51, remarks by Steven S. Freiberg, Citigroup’s head of banking retail oper-
tions.
13 Interview on Indian television, March 3, 2011, NDTV:
ttp://www.ndtv.com/video/player/news/vikram-pandit-on-citigroup-
urnaround/192488?Npic.
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ransaction-oriented banking is not only more susceptible to a
udden spur in momentum (demand-type effect), but also the
easibility of financial institutions to quickly mobilize resources
nd give in to the sudden opportunities (supply effect) seems
reater than for relationship banking activities.
The competitive dynamics plays an important role. When
nancial markets are exuberant, banks that abstain from for
xample trading activities – one of the financial market activ-
ties that can be expanded quickly – may look less profitable
nd might feel ‘left behind’ in the earnings game vis-à-vis other
anks. This is precisely what happened with UBS, one of the big-
er victims in the 2007–2009 crisis. An internal investigation
n 2008 – following massive losses on subprime investments
discovered that its troublesome subprime investments were
ndertaken following pressure from external consultants that
ointed at its fixed income activities that were lagging those
f competitors. To fill this gap UBS was advised “to close key
roduct gaps” which explicitly referred to subprime investment
ehicles (UBS, 2008, p. 11).
.1. Internal dynamics
Let’s now focus on the internal dynamics of banks combining
ransaction- and relationship-based activities. Trading activities
ithin banks have grown enormously and seem sometimes in
onflict with the ‘traditional’ relationship-oriented activities.
n interesting example is proprietary trading, an activity that
as gained importance, and arguably seems to have contributed
ignificantly to the profitability of banks in recent years.14
A noteworthy example of a banking institution where propri-
tary trading gained importance rapidly was the Barings Bank, a
ritish bank with a long tradition in corporate banking. Barings
ailed in 1995 due to trading losses.15 Some interpret the Barings
ebacle as a meltdown caused by a clash of cultures: aggres-
ive and ambitious traders versus traditional and conservative
ankers. For them, better internal controls and external supervi-
ion aimed at aligning incentives seem obvious remedies (Jorion,
000, p. 43). The economics of banking may however dictate a
ore fundamental analysis, one that transcends the specifics of
arings and sheds light on banks’ strategic choices in general.
ssume that the risk inherent in the trading activity is not fully
ccounted for.16 In a sense this was the case because counterpar-
ies to Barings’ trading activity felt safe because Barings as an
ntity was effectively underwriting the trading risks. Also risks
ight have been underestimated such that risk premiums were
elatively low (see Section 6).ctivity is free-riding on the bank at large. This may have three
onsequences: (i) proprietary trading appears more profitable
14 Elsas et al. (2010) show that higher margins from non-interest revenues
ncreased bank profitability.
15 The now infamous trader, Nick Leeson, lost £827 million ($1.3 billion)
peculating on futures contracts in Barings’ Singapore office.
16 The trading activity involves substantial risks, thus establishing the fair risk-
djusted cost of funds is important. Banks try to resolve this by allocating (costly)
apital to the trading unit.
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funding in the financial market. Competition from the financial
market (as well as interbank competition) will lead to more
resource–intensive relationship lending, and reduce transaction
19 Berlin and Mester (1999) provide a related, albeit different, argument. Their72 A.W.A. Boot / Review of Devel
han it really is, (ii) a proprietary trading unit does not sufficiently
nternalize risks, and (iii) other – mainly relationship-oriented
activities of banks face (over time) an unfairly high cost of
unds. The latter would come about because proprietary trading
ould elevate the risk of the institution at large. The implica-
ions are twofold. First, proprietary traders may operate with
ittle market discipline. As we will argue in Section 6, market
iscipline might be lacking in banking in any case, but free rid-
ng of the trading activity on the bank at large makes it worse.
onsequently, the only corrective mechanisms might be internal
ontrols and external supervision.
Second, banks may become less competitive in their
elationship-oriented activities. That is proprietary trading might
ave been granted an artificially low cost of capital, at the
xpense of a (ultimately) prohibitively high cost of capital for
he bank as a whole. Other – mainly relationship-oriented activ-
ties – are then implicitly taxed and falsely appear not profitable.
hus, proprietary trading could undermine the bank’s compet-
tive edge in its relationship banking business, and that is what
he quotes at the beginning of this section point at.17
While we have highlighted Barings as an example, we could
ust as well have used UBS. In the UBS report (UBS, 2008),
t was noted that the investments in mortgage backed securi-
ies were charged a very low cost of capital, and that bonuses
ere paid on the excess return relative to this underpriced fund-
ng cost level. Not surprisingly, this gave ample incentive to
ncrease exposure to these securities even further. While the high
triple-AAA) credit rating on the MBS securities might have
een an excuse, it is surprising that apparently no independent
ue diligence was undertaken.
A related mechanism is that such trading activities initially
ppear very profitable (as long as the boom lasts), and that during
hat time those departments engaged in this activity will gain
ower. What this does is that power is shifted from more prudent
elationship banking activities to those trading units. This will
ffect the overall balance of power and may tilt the institution
way from its relationship banking franchise.
.2. Relationship banking and competition: some
heoretical observations
The academic literature has offered strong support for the
mportance of relationship banking.18 But how does this relate
o the arguments that are often made to explain banks’ increasing
nvolvement in transaction activities? Two arguments explaining
possibly desired (or indispensable) shift to transaction-oriented
anking dominate; both are related to the competitive envi-
onment. First, it is often argued that in a more competitive
nvironment banks need to look for alternative sources of
evenue outside their traditional domain. The other is that com-
etition undermines the feasibility of recouping investments
17 It is important to realize that investment banking can be relationship-oriented
s well. Proprietary trading is one of the activities that is clearly not.
18 This subsection follows in part Boot and Thakor (2010).
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n relationship banking, and that endogenously transaction-
riented banking gains importance.
The first argument – the need to look for alternative sources of
evenue in a more competitive environment – is somewhat prob-
ematic because it does not explain why banks would be good at
hat. Why undertake other activities unless linked one way or the
ther to the banks’ competencies? Should banks in that case not
ust shrink? Key is then that there need to be complementarities
o rationalize banks choice to engage in other activities.
On the second argument an interesting literature has devel-
ped that looks at how competition might affect the incentives
or investing in relationship banking. While this may ultimately
e an empirical question, two diametrically opposite points
f view have emerged theoretically. One is that competition
mong financiers encourages borrowers to switch to other banks
r to the financial market. The consequent shortening of the
xpected “life-span” of bank–borrower relationships may inhibit
he reusability of information and diminish the value of infor-
ation. Banks then experience weaker incentives to acquire
costly) proprietary information and may choose to reduce their
elationship-specific investments, and relationships may suffer.
ne formulation of this negative effect of competition on banks’
ncentives to invest in relationship banking is that increased
redit market competition could impose tighter constraints on
he ability of borrowers and lenders to intertemporally share sur-
luses (see Petersen and Rajan, 1995). In particular, it becomes
ore difficult for banks to ‘subsidize’ borrowers in earlier peri-
ds in return for a share of the rents in the future. Thus, the
unding role for banks particularly for less established borrowers
ay not be sustainable in the face of sufficiently high competi-
ion. This implies that interbank competition may diminish bank
ending.19
The opposite point of view is that competition may actually
levate the importance of a relationship-orientation as a distinct
ompetitive edge. The general idea is that competition reduces
rofit margins most on commoditized products and increases the
mportance of differentiation. Relationship lending is one way of
ifferentiating. Boot and Thakor (2000) formalize this argument
o show that a more competitive environment may encourage
anks to become more client-driven and customize services,
hus focusing more on relationship banking.20 They distinguish
etween ‘passive’ transaction lending and more intensive rela-
ionship lending. Transaction lending competes head-on withnalysis suggests that competition forces banks to pay market rates on deposits,
hich may impede their ability to engage in the potentially value-enhancing
moothing of lending rates. This is also directly related to Allen and Gale (1995)
ho see intermediaries as vehicles that can smooth lending rates over time, and
nancial markets focused on cross sectional diversification.
20 In related work, Hauswald and Marquez (2006) focus on a bank’s incentives
o acquire borrower-specific information in order to gain market share, and
inc¸ (2000) examines a bank’s reputational incentives to honor commitments
o finance higher quality firms.
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risks taken in the trading unit dictate a much higher cost of cap-
ital. This is what banks try to deal with when allocating capital
internally.
23 This does not mean that capital structure indifference applies to banks. As
is well known, there might be frictions that causes deviations from the M&MA.W.A. Boot / Review of Devel
ending, since this mitigates the margin-reducing effects of
rice competition. The absolute level of relationship lending is,
owever, non-monotonic in the level of competition: initially
ompetition increases relationship lending, but when compe-
ition heats up too much, investments in bank lending capacity
ill suffer and that may start to constrain relationship lending.
Another important consideration is that relationships may
oster the exchange of information, but may simultaneously give
enders an information monopoly and undermine competitive
ricing. The informational monopoly on the “inside” lender’s
ide may be smaller if a borrower engages in multiple bank-
ng relationships. This would mitigate the possibilities for rent
xtraction by informed lenders and induce more competitive
ricing (see Sharpe, 1990). Transaction-oriented finance, how-
ver, may give banks little incentive to acquire information but is
otentially subject to more competition. This suggests that mar-
ets for transaction-oriented finance may fail when problems
f asymmetric information are insurmountable without explicit
nformation acquisition and information-processing interven-
ion by banks. This argument is used by some to highlight the
irtues of (relationship-oriented) bank-dominated systems (e.g.
ermany and Japan) vis-à-vis market-oriented systems like the
S. This is part of the literature on the design of financial systems
see Allen and Gale, 1995).21
What this discussion indicates is that the impact of com-
etition on relationship banking is complex; several effects
eed to be disentangled. However, recent empirical evidence
see Degryse and Ongena, 2007) seems to support the notion
hat the orientation of relationship banking adapts to increas-
ng interbank competition, so higher competition does not drive
ut relationship lending. Despite this adaptation, there is also
vidence that in recent years the geographic distance between
orrowers and lenders has increased, and that this has been
ccompanied by higher loan defaults (see DeYoung et al., 2008).
An important observation is that competition could lead to
onsolidation in banking, and that in itself might have an impact
n the importance of relationship banking. In particular, con-
olidation may undermine the incentives of banks to produce
nd utilize soft information. Recent research has shown that
arge banks are less capable in using soft information (see
erger and Udell, 2002; Stein, 2002; and for empirical evidence
erger et al., 2005). Larger, more centralized banks base their
redit approval decisions more on hard (verifiable) information,
hereas smaller (more decentralized) banks can more easily use
oft information.
As a consequence relationship banking could suffer. This
ight be particularly important for the financing of smaller
nd informationally opaque firms, and also has implications for
he optimal decision-making structure of larger financial institu-
ions (see Stein, 2002; Liberti, 2003; Strahan, 2008).22 Sapienza
21 Another important insight is that that bank ownership type (foreign, state-
wned or private domestic) affects the bank’s choice between transaction and
elationship lending, see the empirical work of Berger et al. (2008).
22 Berger et al. (1998) show that the actual supply of loans to small businesses
ay not go down after bank mergers, since they invite entry of de novo banks
hat specialize in small business lending (see also Strahan, 2008).
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2002) finds that bank mergers involving at least one large bank
esult in a lower supply of loans to small borrowers by the
erged entity. As stated, this could be linked to the difficulty
hat larger organizations have in using soft information. These
rguments could also point at the importance of proximity in
elationship banking and actually suggest that larger banks may
ail to grab the benefits of relationship banking if they do not del-
gate enough authority lower into the organization (see Degryse
nd Ongena, 2005). That is, the organizational structure of banks
ight play a crucial role.
The extensive work in the field of financial intermediation
oints at the distinct value of relationship banking. We do not
elieve that this work has been invalidated by recent develop-
ents in the financial sector. To the contrary, much we have
aid indicates that banks may have destroyed value by stray-
ng from their client-focused strategies. Academic research has
ong shown that banks should be “. . .extra cautious in forays
utside of home markets, and above all, cultivate deep client
elationships” (BCG, 2010b).
. Cost of capital fallacy
The potential misallocation of resources, and shifts in balance
etween transaction and relationship banking activities is further
ffected by the beliefs that banks have about their cost of capital.
ankers see capital as being very expensive, and they seem to
onvey that capital has one price. A bank’s cost of capital might
e set in the mind of bankers at for example 15%. Whatever the
resumption, capital does not have one price. Standard capital
tructure theory tells us that the per unit cost of capital depends
n the risks that this capital is exposed to. More risk generally
mplies a higher cost of capital. This is indeed core to the well
nown Modigliani and Miller capital structure theory, and more
enerally core to the theory of corporate finance.23
Two important implications now follow. First, the per unit
ost of capital will not be the same for all of the bank’s activities.
he level of risk and the risk characteristics will determine the
nit cost of capital for each of the activities. Applying an aver-
ge bank’s cost of capital to its proprietary trading unit would
herefore be wrong. Given the generally well diversified, and
hus low risks, found in the bank at large, the (non-diversifiable)orld. Yet the general notion that the cost of capital is affected by the risk that the
apital is exposed to is hard to refute (see also Admati et al., 2011). To what extent
anking is special, particularly with its role in liquidity transformation, is open
or debate. Some alternative theories on the financial structure of banks focus on
he disciplining role of fragile short term funding (see Calomiris and Kahn, 1991;
iamond and Rajan, 2001). The idea there is that such fragile debt disciplines
bank (i.e. it will behave well to prevent a run), yet, as Shin (2009) argues
uch a financial structure would be highly destabilizing, particularly considering
xogenous industry-wide events (beyond an individual bank’s control) that may
rigger a confidence crisis among financiers. Such fragile debt would then cause
severe liquidity crisis in the industry.
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The capital allocations are typically based on Economic
apital, VaR and RAROC-type methodologies. Allocating dif-
erential amounts of capital (at a fixed cost per unit) might be
quivalent to differentiating the cost of capital across activi-
ies. In practice however risk differentials may not be taken into
ccount sufficiently. Moreover, the momentum driven financial
arkets may underestimate risk and hence cause distortions in
he capital allocation.
The second implication is possibly even more important:
anks should not choose to engage in certain activities solely
ecause they have the capital available. This directly addresses
he distortions that the simple belief that capital has somehow
high (exogenously) fixed price induces. The critical observa-
ion is that ‘putting capital to use’ increases the per unit cost
f capital. Therefore, engaging in proprietary trading to exploit
he bank’s capital will elevate the cost of this capital, and as a
onsequence increase the cost of funds for the bank at large.
Banks that consider themselves ‘overcapitalized’ and decide
o put this capital to use may thus not create value at all. This
rgument may also explain why banks consider capital (pro-
ibitively?) expensive. If potential investors anticipate that banks
ill put their capital to use at all cost, they will gross-up their
equired return accordingly.24 Banks then can issue equity only
t discount prices. These beliefs and anticipations create a per-
erse equilibrium. Given the bankers’ state of mind – fixed
riced, expensive capital that needs to be put to use as quickly
s possible – the market responds rationally by charging a high
rice for capital.25 And given these anticipations by the market,
he bankers’ beliefs are justified and confirmed in equilibrium.
As we will highlight in Section 6, taking into account that
nancial markets may go through euphoric (boom) periods with
nderpriced risk amplifies the distortions highlighted in this sec-
ion. If risk is underpriced, loading up on risk (via leverage, asset
isk or mismatches) seems to create value. One of the puzzles is
hy banks appear to maximize ROE while corporate finance the-
ry tells us that risk should be taken into account, and hence the
isk-adjusted ROE should be targeted. Once you accept that risk
ight be underpriced in good times, it becomes easier to under-
tand why maximizing ROE is so prevalent. In the extreme, if
isk can be ignored ROE would become a sensible measure. This
24 Several examples from the 2007–2009 financial crisis demonstrate the risks
ssociated with banks’ rapid growth. The Icelandic bank Landsbanki realized
xtraordinary growth in the Netherlands and the UK by offering Icesave online
avings accounts with attractive interest rates. In only five months of presence
n the Netherlands, it raised D1.7bn in approximately 130,000 accounts (De
oor et al., 2009, pp. 54, 56). The subsequent collapse of Landsbanki created a
iplomatic dispute between Iceland and the UK and the Netherlands. Similarly,
NG expanded aggressively in the US with its ING Direct business. The tens
f millions in deposits that were acquired in the US market had to be invested
ocally with some requirements linked to the housing market. Without much
f a physical presence in the US, massive investments were made in Alt-A
ortgage securities that were questioned in the financial turmoil of 2007–2009.
NG needed support from the Dutch government.
25 A corollary to the ‘fixed price notion’ is that banks might be tempted to
espond to higher capital requirements by increasing risk, unless this risk is fully
aptured in the risk-based capital requirements. Actually, it may help explain the
apid elevation of risk prior to the crisis when banking was considered adequately
apitalized.
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ould also explain why increasing leverage is popular: increasing
everage elevates ROE.26
The proliferation of financial markets has worsened this prob-
em. It has become much easier to quickly take advantage of
arket-driven opportunities.27
. Ownership structure: partnerships, stability and
nstitutional franchise value
As stated, key to recent financial innovations is the mar-
etability and (excessive?) ‘changeability’ that it may cause.
e pointed at the opportunistic behavior that this may cause. An
mportant link to the ownership structure and stability of invest-
ent banks versus commercial (relationship oriented) banks can
e made.
Traditional relationship-oriented banks seem incentivized to
uild up institutional franchise value. Individuals are part of the
rganization as an entity, and the continuity of the organization
nd lasting relationships with its clientele defines its value. The
alue cannot be transferred and cannot readily be assigned to
ndividual stars. In other words, the value created is an inte-
ral part of the organizational entity and not portable as part of
ndividuals.
Investment banks on the other hand, particularly their trading
nd transaction activities,28 seem more based on the individual
tar concept with high marketability of individuals. As a conse-
uence, less institutional franchise value is built up; individual
ranchise values dominate. If this is the only difference then
relationship banking institution has substantial implied fran-
hise value, while the investment bank has little implied value,
nd hence Keeley’s (1990) analysis would suggest that an invest-
ent bank would take lots of risk, while the franchise value of
commercial bank would help curtail its risk taking.29
Historically investment banks have solved the marketabil-
ty problem – and the potential lack of institutional franchise
alue – by having partnerships. The partnership structure has
wo dimensions that could help jointly resolve the marketabil-
ty problem, and related opportunistic, risky behavior (and star
henomenon):
a partnership means that bankers have their personal wealth
tied up in the business—they own the equity claim of the
business;
the partnership structure is such that the equity is not (opti-
mally) marketable.
26 Haldane et al. (2010) also point at the distortions caused by the explicit
deposit insurance) and/or implicit (TBTF) safety net.
27 See also Adrian and Shin (2010).
28 Many of the activities in an investment bank are relationship based (see
ection 3), trading is typically not. In recent times, traders appear to have gained
ower within investment banks, e.g. more recent leaders of Goldman Sachs
ame from the trading side. In any case, we do not see the distinction between
ommercial banking and investment banking as an absolute dichotomy.
29 There is some value in the multitude of connections that are combined in the
nvestment bank, but this is also pointing at externalities of failure (see Duffie,
010).
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The latter implies that stars cannot take their money out, or
nly at a reduced value. Implicitly, this means that non-portable
ranchise value is created, and this value is transferred over time
o future partners. Interesting examples exist where institutions
ave made changes that have destroyed this structure. For exam-
le, with a go-public transformation (converting a partnership in
listed shareholder owned company) the current partners effec-
ively expropriate all franchise value that has been built up over
ime.30 Even worse, once the partnership is gone, stars may no
onger be ‘under control.’ Their financial interest is no longer
ied to the firm. This may elevate risk and reduce stability.31
In commercial banking the enhanced marketability – and with
t, transaction focus – may have opened the door for some type of
tar phenomenon as well. In a sense, it may have brought com-
ercial banking closer to investment banking, and similar issues
ight be at play. This may have induced opportunistic behav-
or particularly because partnership structures in commercial
anking never have been very common.
In any case, partnerships among major financial institutions
re rare. The important point however is that via enhancing mar-
etability the demise of partnerships could have undermined
tability. As a caveat, all this does not mean that there might not
e distinct benefits associated with these developments as well.
hat we have stressed is the potential downside. We are however
repared to conclude that the financial crisis has made us look
ore favorably at alternative ownership structures like mutuals
nd cooperative banks (e.g. Credit Agricole in France). It may
ell be that also with our thoughts about the type of ownership
tructure we should be more open to diversity. After all, one of
he problems of the increasing intertwined nature of banks and
arkets is that it might make banks look more alike, and that
ould induce systemic risk. Diversity in ownership structures
ight help counter this.
. Does market discipline work?
Market discipline is an often discussed feature of banking. In
he positive sense it means that banks might be induced to behave
ell because financial markets may reward and/or punish them.
liss and Flannery (2002) talk about two components of market
iscipline: investors identifying the condition of a banking firm
n a timely fashion. This requires monitoring by investors. And
ubsequently the feeding back of investors’ responses in the
ehavior of banks. One could identify as a third channel the use
30 Morrison and Wilhelm (2007, 2008) analyze the decision of major US
nvestment banks to go public. Investment banks were initially organized as
artnerships. The opacity of partnerships and illiquidity of their shares allowed
or successful mentoring and training in tacit non-contractible human skills,
uch as building relationships, negotiating M&A deals and advising clients.
hey have argued that IT technology necessitated heavy investments and that
ecessitated investment banks to go public. Potentially confirming this is that
holesale-oriented investment banks such as Morgan Stanley for which tacit
uman capital was more important than IT technology went public later than
etail oriented investment banks such as Merrill Lynch.
31 Publicly listed firms sometimes use restricted stock to create some fixity in
he ownership structure, and continued loyalty of key personnel.
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f market information for official supervisory intervention (see
lannery, 2009; Llewellyn, 2010).
Supervisors have subscribed to the notion of market disci-
line as well. For example, in the Basel II agreement the third
illar aims at enhancing market discipline by pushing for more
isclosure. The idea seems sensible. Why not use market infor-
ation, and have markets help in disciplining banks? This seems
articularly important considering the difficult task that super-
isors face: a mushrooming financial sector with ever more
omplex financial institutions and interconnections (Kaufman,
003). Basel II thus intends to make this task easier for regula-
ors/supervisors by improving transparency, and hence market
iscipline. Possibly supervisors might also use the market-
evealed information in their supervisory practices.
On the surface one feels sympathetic for these ideas. Market
iscipline would be a welcome supplement for enforcing pru-
ent banking. How might market discipline actually work? At
he very least one could say that pricing information and mar-
et signals will always provide some information, and hence
hould potentially be valuable. In the literature, particularly sub-
rdinated debt has been pushed as a desired source of funding
or financial institutions because it could give valuable pricing
nformation (Bliss, 2001). Such pricing signals could augment
he supervisors’ information about an institution’s risk, or, alter-
atively, could discourage risk taking by a financial institution
irectly. That is, when markets envision too much risk tak-
ng subordinated funding might not be available anymore, or
anks might be discouraged to take risks anticipating the upward
djustment in subordinated debt yields.32
While market discipline may play a role, the extent to which
t helps impose discipline on the financial sector at large is open
or discussion. Even if the market could observe potential risks,
ollective action problems among investors (free riding) and
nticipated government bail-outs could lead to quite distorted
ricing signals. Some of the discipline runs via the banks’ credit
atings, and these in turn may depend on market signals. As
e have seen in the last few years, credit rating agencies might
e subjected to conflicts of interest, may not adjust their ratings
imely, and/or have little true added value in assessing underlying
isks.33
There is some support for the presence of market discipline,
ut there is controversy on whether market discipline helps or
inders the regulatory task of maintaining banking stability.
hat seems to be true is that market discipline comes in waves,
nd particularly in a financial crisis may overwhelm individ-
al players and the industry at large. Market discipline might
32 Decamps et al. (2004), Goyal (2005), and Barth et al. (2004) offer some
upport for these ideas.
33 Observe also that a downward adjustment in the credit rating might act as a
rigger that could in itself destabilize an institution. A downgrade could induce
type of run with investors. For example, many institutional investors are only
llowed to invest in investment grade securities. A downgrade to non-investment
rade may then lead to a mass exodus. These problems are far from trivial. Credit
atings do also play a role as focal points in financial markets. This may help in
oordinating beliefs in the financial market and reduce fragility, see Boot et al.
2006).
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e subject to herding behavior, as everybody “heads simultane-
usly for the exit” in more stressful times. As such it could be a
ource of instability.34
We see a paradox in the notion of market discipline. The
pportunistic behavior that we pointed at is driven by banks
ngaging in particular financial market linked activities. And
he enhanced marketability, that we discussed earlier, may have
acilitated this. Those activities are heavily driven by momen-
um in the financial markets; for example overoptimistic views in
he market about the profitability of particular strategies. These
pportunities appear to mushroom in euphoric times in the finan-
ial markets, and typically go hand in hand with underpriced risk,
.e. low risk premiums. It is the market that defines the opportu-
ities and underestimates risk; banks seek to (opportunistically)
xploit them.
But now the paradox. In the way we have formulated the
rgument, financial markets that are supposed to engage in mar-
et discipline underestimate risks and are momentum driven,
nd in doing so encourage banks to engage in specific activities.
ow then can we expect these same markets to impose market
iscipline? It appears to us that market discipline is not present
hen banks follow financial market inspired strategies. Things
re even worse because the correlation in strategies between
nancial institutions will then be high because all see the same
pportunities and hence we see herding behavior. Systemic risk
ould be enormous and not checked by market discipline.
What this points at is that from a macro-prudential view (i.e.
ystem wide view) market discipline is not effective. This sup-
orts Flannery’s (2009) analysis that in the summer of 2007
either share prices nor CDS spreads provided information about
ending problems. We tend to conclude that market discipline
ight more readily work for idiosyncratic risk choices of an indi-
idual financial institution (i.e. across institutions) than for the
hoices of the sector as a whole. In the financial sector with the
orrelated strategies induced by momentum in financial markets,
arket discipline seems ineffective.
. Strategy of ﬁnancial players and scale and scope
conomies
What drives financial players in choosing their scale and
cope of operations? This question is important because the
ize and particularly the complexity of financial institutions is
concern to regulators and supervisors.35 While the current
34 The relevant question is whether market discipline could help in containing
ystemic risks, or whether market responses merely amplify such risks (see
lannery, 1998).
35 We will not focus on (historic) differences in financial systems across coun-
ries. Financial systems are often characterized as either being bank-based
continental Europe) or financial market driven (US, UK). In the former, bank
nancing and relationships are dominant, while direct funding from the finan-
ial market plays a more important role in the latter. Financial innovations
ay have affected these systems differently. The distinction is not as sharp
s the dichotomy might suggest, e.g. more than half of US businesses is bank-
nanced and financial markets clearly play a role in continental Europe; hence
o system is fully market or bank-driven. Nevertheless, an interesting question is
hether the more recent proliferation of financial innovations might impact those
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tatements in the industry might suggest that institutions ‘go
ack to basics’, i.e. reduce complexity, focus and simplify
roduct offerings (KPMG, 2011), we expect the scale and scope
xtending strategies to continue. As we will discuss below,
ize will continue to be a driver in the industry. This is part of
he ongoing underlying market forces in the industry. Whether
ize really offers scale or scope economies is a totally different
uestion. Research on this remains rather inconclusive, or in the
ords of Richardson et al. (2010): “Indeed, the recent studies
irror the findings [. . .] some 15 years earlier [. . .] there was
o predominance of evidence either for or against economies
f scale in the financial sector.”
.1. Observations on scale and scope
A first observation is that banks like to combine many dif-
erent activities. This distinguishes banks from many of their
ompetitors, e.g. non-banking financial institutions like mutual
unds and finance companies. The latter often choose to special-
ze and therefore are much more transparent. Banks generally
hoose to diversify their activities. Although few would read-
ly deny that some degree of diversification is necessary, banks
eem to engage in a very broad variety of activities. The ques-
ion that arises is what is the optimal conglomeration of bank
ctivities, and what structure will the industry migrate to?
Until recently, the complexity (or opaqueness) even meant
hat bankers themselves did not really know the profitability
f many of their activities. Cross-subsidies were the rule, and
nternal cost accounting was rudimentary. While cross-subsidies
ay sometimes be an optimal competitive response, often they
ill not be sustainable in a competitive environment. A related
ssue is that implicit or explicit government guarantees and too-
ig-to-fail (TBTF) concerns might give artificial competitive
dvantages to size. Universal banks, while not particularly effi-
ient (BCG, 2010a), might have sufficient ‘protected’ revenues
o compete with more focused players.36
The coincidence of the consolidation trend in the financial
ector with increased competition has led many to believe that
he massive restructuring observed in banking is a response
o a more competitive environment. That is, as commercial
anking becomes more competitive, banks need to examine all
ossible ways to eliminate inefficiencies from their cost struc-
ures, for example, by merging with other banks and realizing
cale efficiencies through elimination of redundant branches
nd back-office consolidation. Moreover, diminishing margins
n commercial banking might have invited banks to look out-
ide their traditional domain (see Section 3). Some non-banking
ctivities may (appear to) offer higher margins and make scope
ystems differently. One observation is that bank-based and financial market
riven systems might have become more alike. The marketability associated
ith recent financial innovations may have weakened the distinction between
ank-based and financial market driven systems.
36 Indeed, this is one of the complaints of more focused investment banking
nstitutions. Universal banks can leverage their balance sheet (read: cross sub-
idize) to secure investment banking business (e.g. Financial Times, March 21,
011, p. 17: “US banks face fresh scrutiny on lending”).
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positive announcement effects. Moreover, focus in activities
was shown to be more important than geographical focus, albeitA.W.A. Boot / Review of Devel
xpansion look attractive. The key question is whether these
esponses indeed create value.37
Scale and scope economies are often cited as rationale for
hy financial institutions tend to growth in size and com-
lexity (scope) over time. But are scale and scope economies
ruly present? Sources of scale and scope economies include
see Boot, 2003; Walter, 2003): (i) information-technology
elated economies; (ii) reputation and marketing/brand name
elated benefits; (iii) (financial) innovation related economies;
nd (iv) diversification benefits. Information technology related
conomies particularly refer to back office efficiencies and
istribution-network related benefits. Transaction processing
ffers distinct scale economies. And information technology
evelopments facilitate an increasing array of financial prod-
cts and services to be offered through the same distribution
etwork, and thus allow for cross selling. Reputation and brand
ame/marketing related economies may be present in the joint
arketing of products to customers. Brand image is partially
arketing related, but is also related to the notions of ‘trust’
nd ‘reputation.’ (Financial) innovation related economies par-
icularly refer to large(r) institutions that might be in a better
osition to recoup the fixed costs of those innovations.
Diversification benefits are (at first sight) more controver-
ial. In many cases, conglomeration may lead to a valuation
iscount which could point at (anticipated) inefficiencies. This
s in line with corporate finance theory that tells us that investors
an choose to diversify and that this does not need to be done at
he firm level. However, key to the business of banking is risk
rocessing and absorption. And confidence in a bank requires
t to be safe. Diversification is then needed to be able to absorb
isks and be safe. Observe also that several bank activities bene-
t from a better credit rating, which suggests that diversification
t the level of the bank has value.38
.2. Are scale and scope beneﬁts real?
Scale and scope economies in banking have been studied
xtensively. A survey paper by Berger et al. (1999) concludes
hat, in general, the empirical evidence cannot readily identify
ubstantial economies of scale or scope. Illustrative is Saunders
2000). He cites 27 studies, 13 of which found diseconomies of
cope, 6 found economies of scope and 8 were neutral.39
37 The banks’ inclination to expand scope has some notable exceptions. For
xample, while we had observed a spectacular cross-industry merger of Citicorp
nd Travelers, bringing together insurance activities with bank-oriented finan-
ial services, more recently, Citigroup has been divesting its insurance assets.
imilarly, Credit Suisse expanded into insurance by acquiring the insurance com-
any Winterthur, but lately has been divesting these assets. Similar processes
re observed with other bancassurance conglomerates.
38 For many guarantees or contracts and activities that involve recourse, the
redit standing of the guarantor is crucial for the credibility of the contract.
ester (2008) emphasizes that bank production decisions affect bank risk. Scale
nd scope related decisions have via diversification an effect on risk, and that in
urn may affect choices about risk exposure.
39 With respect to the empirical evidence on scale and scope, some general
bservations can be made. First, scale and scope economies are empirically
ften dominated by adverse changes in managerial efficiency. For example,
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An important caveat is that this research mainly involves U.S.
tudies using data from the 70s and 80s. Apart from poten-
ial methodological shortcomings the results therefore do not
apture the dramatic structural and technological changes in
anking that have taken place since then. Furthermore, they
eflect the historic fragmentation of the U.S. banking indus-
ry due to severe regulatory constraints on the type of banking
banks could engage in commercial banking or investment bank-
ng, but not both) and the geographic reach of activities (limits
n interstate banking) that were present till the deregulation in
he 90s (see Calomiris and Karceski, 1998).
Some more recent studies examine the existence of a diversi-
cation discount for financial institutions. Laeven and Levine
2007) confirm the existence of a diversification discount in
anks that combine lending and non-lending financial services,
nd suggest that the potential economies of scope in finan-
ial conglomerates are not large enough to compensate for
otential agency problems and inefficiencies associated with
ross-subsidies.40 Rajan et al. (2000) emphasize that, even
hough conglomerates trade at a discount on average, 39.3%
f the conglomerates trade at a premium. They show that the
nterrelation between activities within the conglomerate is of
rucial importance. Diversified firms can trade at a premium if
he dispersion between activities is low. High dispersion induces
nefficiencies which point at the importance of focus within
he conglomerate. In particular, one should look at what type
f mergers and acquisitions involve scale and scope benefits.
ecent research suggests that mergers with both a geographic
nd activity focus are most value enhancing. Similarly, in ana-
yzing scope and scale issues, one should focus on the type of
ctivities. What are the scale economies in each activity? And
hat product-mix offers true scope economies?
In this spirit, DeLong (2001) looked at the shareholder gains
more specifically, the immediate announcement effect on
hare prices – from focused versus diversifying bank mergers
n the U.S. between 1988 and 1995. She found that focused
ergers, both on the level of activity and geography, havehe latter was important as well. Activity-diversifying mergers
nefficiencies in managing larger organizations may mitigate possible scale and
cope benefits. Second, scale and scope economies are difficult to disentangle
rom changes in market power. Increasing scale and scope may facilitate market
ower, and thus elevate profitability in the absence of scale and scope economies.
hird, to the extent that mergers may change the structure and dynamics of the
ndustry, the abnormal stock returns associated with merger announcements
eflect such changes.
40 Schmid and Walter (2009) confirm the Laeven and Levine (2007) results,
nd verify that this discount is indeed caused by diversification, and not by inef-
ciencies that already existed before the diversification. There are two important
ualifications on conglomerate discounts as measured in the literature (follow-
ng the well known Berger and Ofek (1995) study that – as one of the first
identified persistent discounts). Chevalier (2004) shows that controlling for
he pre-conglomeration performance of businesses is important: inefficiencies
easured after a merger often already existed prior to the merger. A second qual-
fication is that discounts are often measured as a ratio (e.g. return on invested
apital). A merger that leads to larger investments may reduce the average return
ut increase the absolute overall return (in $s).
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ad no positive announcement effects. These results point at
he presence of scale rather than scope economies.41
The typical result in these earlier studies was however that
ven scale economies were exhausted at relatively small bank
izes. More recent evidence points at more persistent scale
conomies. Wheelock and Wilson (2009) and Feng and Serletis
2010) find increasing returns to scale and Elsas et al. (2010)
nd increasing returns to scope also for larger financial institu-
ions. Apart from methodological issues (see Mester, 2010), this
ight be driven by information technology developments that
ight only have showed up in more recent data.
.3. What to expect?
We would subscribe to Robert DeYoung’s statement that
. . .scale economies are a distraction” (DeYoung, 2010). What
e observe is that many players choose a conglomerate model
nd go for size (and complexity). In terms of efficiency and
ffectiveness the academic research would not readily point to
real superiority of such model. Indeed, it might very well be
egulatory induced (e.g. taking advantage of TBTF benefits; see
eldman, 2010a).
As a final observation, the structure of the industry that we
xpect to naturally follow from market forces is trimodal. Apart
rom these conglomerates (also called large complex financial
nstitutions, LCFI) which might be more investment banking or
ommercial banking centered, large specialized financial insti-
utions will co-exist, as well as smaller banking institutions
apitalizing on relationship-focused niches.42 However, it is
41 Isolating potential scale and scope economies is important. On the demand
ide, the proliferation of savings products and their link to pensions, mutual
unds and life insurance clearly pushes for joint distribution, and thereby sug-
est economies of scope. IT developments might have made it possible to better
xploit potential scope economies with multiple product offerings to a particu-
ar customer group, using new direct distribution channels with relatively easy
ccess to (formerly) distant customers. The very same IT developments how-
ver also offer better possibilities for focused single-product players. Interfaces
may) come about that help bundle the product offerings of specialized providers,
hereby becoming a substitute for an integrated provider. The lesson is that only
ery well managed integrated financial services firms may realize positive scope
conomies.
42 This could build on the insight in section 3 that larger banks are not very
ood at serving smaller customers. More specifically, the use of soft informa-
ion might be hampered in larger organizations. A question is whether larger
nstitutions could successfully imitate a ‘multi-local approach’ in which sub-
idiaries would focus on local characteristics of individual countries, and be
elegated enough autonomy. But the holding company would supply activi-
ies where scope and scale economies would be the biggest. Rotation practices
ould then (theoretically) bring better governance in subsidiaries compared to
tand alone banking firms. As Unicredit puts it: “UniCredit recognizes the
mportance of specialization. The group utilizes a divisional business model
hat optimizes its ability to meet the needs of a variety of customer segments,
ffering personalized services. UniCredit’s divisional model is based on iden-
ifying well-defined business areas common to all of the markets in which the
roup operates: retail, corporate, private, investment banking and asset man-
gement. The emphasis is on creating specialized product factories and on
entralizing support services. To apply this model, UniCredit uses a multi-local
pproach. This approach is consistent with the group’s goal of being recog-
ized as a highly capable domestic player in each of the markets in which it
s present. Emphasis is placed on the value of establishing a presence in local
i
i
p
i
f
w
t
w
c
c
T
n
d
B
b
o
i
tnt Finance 1 (2011) 167–183
ifficult to make prediction about the future structure of the
ndustry. Uncertainties are daunting; for example, it is very
nclear what the impact of public policy and new regulations
ight ultimately be on the industry.43
But again we expect market forces to continue to press for
ize. In the next section, we will try to answer the question
hether structural measures are needed to reduce complexity.
. Dealing with complexity: breaking-up banks and
iving wills
We will argue that structural measures might be needed
o help contain destabilizing market forces and deal with
omplexity, and that behavioral measures (like higher capital
equirements) are insufficient. Overall we will advocate a com-
rehensive approach to regulation and supervision.
The issue of complexity of financial institutions is heavily
ebated. In other industries one is tempted to say that market
orces will figure out what the optimal configuration of a firm
ight be (subject to anti-trust concerns). However, in bank-
ng complexity can worsen externalities that one might want
o contain. More specifically,
i. complex institutions might be difficult to manage and super-
vise, and effective market discipline might not be expected
(problem of opaqueness);
ii. a complex financial institution may have many, difficult to
discern linkages with the financial system at large. This may
augment TBTF, or rather too-interconnected-to-fail con-
cerns;
ii. as a consequence systemic concerns might become more
prominent;
v. complexity might paralyze supervisors and put them in a
dependent position; e.g. how is timely intervention possible
if the complexity of the institution cannot be grasped by
supervisors?
On the last point, one element of the current reform pro-
osals asks financial institutions to have a living will available,
.e. a detailed recovery and resolution plan that would allow
or an orderly and efficient resolution of financial difficulties
hen they may arise. Such a living will aims at overcominghe complexity of an institution, and the paralysis it may cause
ith the supervisor when problems emerge.44 Taking this con-
ept seriously should probably mean that all relevant financial
ommunities. Global product factories are a key feature of the divisional model.
hey can help exploit the growth potential inherent in UniCredit’s vast branch
etwork.” (http://www.unicreditgroup.eu/en/Investors/Strategy.htm).
43 See for example, McKinsey (2010a,b). Strategic considerations make it also
ifficult to extrapolate from choices that we currently observe in the industry.
oot (2003) explains the rather broad strategies of many banking institutions
y emphasizing that in an uncertain environment banks may want to keep their
ptions open.
44 As Bliss (2003) concludes “. . . until the informational problems are resolved,
t will only be happenstance that LCFIs are discovered to be distressed when
hey are still sufficiently solvent. . .”.
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nstitutions organize themselves in a way that they can be easily
issolved when problems arise. So the complexity might have to
e dealt with upfront, and would then have direct implications
or the organizational structure of the business, i.e. for a bank’s
usiness model (Feldman, 2010b).
One is tempted to conclude that one way of dealing with the
omplexity is to disentangle activities and put them in separate
egal structures (‘subsidiaries’). Those subsidiaries could deal
n an arms-length basis with each other, with each being ade-
uately capitalized without recourse to each other. This would
esemble the non-operating holding company structure that is
iscussed in some OECD studies (Blundell-Wignall et al., 2009).
ith such a structure supervisors could possibly more easily
and timely) target, i.e. rescue, systemically important parts of a
nancial institution in case of distress; other parts could be sold
r dismantled.
In this spirit one could look at the arrangements in New
ealand. In that country much of the banking system is in
he hands of foreign players. New Zealand’s authorities were
keptical about this lack of control, and instituted structural
equirements to address them. The requirements entail enforced
rganization of activities within subsidiaries, but on top of that
equirements that make the New Zealand based subsidiaries
perationally independent from their foreign parents (Herring
nd Carmassi, 2010).45
.1. Can separate legal structures under one corporate roof
e effective?
Whether such separate legal structures are really effective is
nclear. In the market there might still be reputational spillovers
etween the different parts. Similarly, the market may still expect
ntra-group cross subsidization or joint risk bearing with the
roup’s financial strength being perceived behind any individual
ctivity (Lumpkin, 2010).
In practice, financial institutions typically have corporate
tructures that include a myriad of legal entities (Avgouleas
t al., 2010). Banks in this way have become horrendously com-
lex. HSBC for example has in excess of two thousand entities
Llewellyn, 2010). These are typically not designed to augment
ransparency and/or reduce complexity, but rather to engage
n regulatory and tax arbitrage (e.g. capital management). The
egal structures themselves are typically not stand-alone in
45 Following Ng (2007): Banks in New Zealand typically outsource a range of
usiness activities, both to independent and to related-party service providers,
nd both domestically and offshore. The predominance in New Zealand of banks
wned by offshore parent banks, which provide important services to their
ubsidiaries, means that cross-border, related-party outsourcing is of particu-
ar relevance. The outsourcing policy requires a large bank’s board to maintain
egal and practical control over any outsourced functions such that the bank
s able to continue to play its key role of supporting financial activity in the
conomy, both under normal circumstances and (particularly) under stress. The
eserve Bank applies the policy with some flexibility to suit the circumstances
f individual banks. The policy thus ensures that the banking system retains the
bility to avert distress, and underpins the Reserve Bank’s ability to manage
financial crisis, while enabling the financial system to enjoy the benefits of
oreign bank participation.
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ny meaningful way but linked together through intra-group
ransactions, joint back offices and other shared facilities and
ctivities. While these linkages might produce synergies, the
ccompanying complexity seems at odds with having effective
iving wills, or having a business structure that is receptive to
upervision or market discipline.
Complexities are magnified once we take into account cross
order activities and differences in bankruptcy regimes across
ountries (Cumming and Eisenbeis, 2010). Living wills and
he timely intervention they could facilitate might be valuable
articularly in these cross border situations especially when
ntervention occurs before losses become overwhelming. The
atter might be crucial to align the interests of policymakers and
upervisors. The potential for conflicts is considerable consid-
ring the problems associated with burden sharing.
One may expect that the industry will vigorously oppose such
ransparent and arms-length structures that – in their view –
ould limit synergies. Whether these concerns are really valid
annot be readily answered. Real synergies might be limited as
e have seen in Section 7. As we have argued in Section 3,
anks may confuse cross-subsidization with real synergies. The
ncentives of financial institutions might also be to seek com-
lexity and in doing so hold supervisors ‘hostage.’ The implicit
BTF (or too-complex and/or interconnected-to fail) backing
ay further amplify disagreements between the bankers pri-
ately optimal choices and those of society. The reality is that
he non-operating holding company structure as envisioned in
he OECD studies – with transparency via arms-length contracts,
o recourse and separate capitalizations – is a far cry away.
.2. Breaking-up banks?
A valid question is whether in face of this opposition one
hould not be more active and possibly seek a more radical
olution. This refers to structural measures that seek to prescribe
he structure and allowable businesses of banks and other finan-
ial institutions (Llewellyn, 2010).46 Several policymakers have
dvocated such measures. The British have arguably been most
damant. Both Mervin King (Governor Bank of England) and
dair Turner (Chairman of the Financial Services Authority)
ave hinted at the need to split up banks. Actually, the UK gov-
rnment has established an independent Banking Commission
the Vickers Committee’) to look into potential structural reme-
ies. While not directly advocating such measures, Sheila Bair
f the FDIC has advocated that “America’s big international
anks may have to restructure and downsize their operations
ow, unless they can prove they will be easy to dismantle in
nother financial crisis” (as reported by Reuters, March 1st,
011). In terms of actually implementing new policies, the US
46 We also could identify possible structural measures in the operations of finan-
ial markets; for example the introduction of central counterparties to reduce
ounterparty risk in OTC markets. This may help contain contagion. Note that
he focus in this paper is on financial institutions, and less on the functioning of
arkets. As we will argue, we advocate a comprehensive redesign of regulation
nd supervision which would include measures aimed at reducing counterparty
isk.
1 opme
a
F
p
i
v
d
T
d
p
e
c
i
p
1
a
I
b
i
t
t
s
u
l
i
d
t
b
a
h
m
a
l
s
t
f
t
i
b
S
W
t
d
t
E
t
t
m
e
d
b
8
s
i
l
l
H
a
w
t
A
b
s
A
l
a
m
s
e
d
p
c
A
t
i
t
m
I
f
w
6
i
c
p
o
(80 A.W.A. Boot / Review of Devel
ppears to be in the lead with the Volcker Rule (part of the Dodd-
rank Act) that seeks to prohibit the involvement of banks in
roprietary trading, and limit their investments and sponsorship
n hedge funds and private equity.47
European banks have always operated as fully integrated uni-
ersal banks, while in the US the Glass-Steagall Act made a clear
ivision between commercial banking and investment banking.
he demise of this Act at least in part reflects the difficulty (and
esirability?) of enforcing such separation. Indeed, prior to the
assage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Mod-
rnization Act of 1999 which formally repealed Glass-Steagall,
ommercial banks did enter via so-called Section 20 subsidiaries
nvestment banking activities. This may have reflected the com-
lementarity between lending and debt underwriting. Hence, the
999 Financial Services Modernization Act was to some extent
belated response to underlying market forces. But it did more.
t enabled US commercial banks to expand rapidly in investment
anking, and become true financial conglomerates.48
If the complexity makes it impossible for supervisors to (cred-
bly) intervene in a timely fashion, one may start thinking about
he desirability of breaking-up banks. One question is whether
his is really possible. And the other is how breaking-up banks
quares with the broader objectives of supervision, and partic-
larly the lessons learnt from the financial crisis. At least two
essons could be identified:
i. Contagion should be addressed;
i. Core commercial banking functions might have to be safe-
guarded.
The latter typically refers to the payment system and local
eposit and lending operations. If a break-up indeed increases
ransparency and reduces complexity, timely intervention might
ecome easier which might fit both lessons.49 But this is from
n ex post perspective, i.e., after problems have emerged. But
ow would a more fragmented banking system operate from a
ore ex ante perspective? Does it reduce contagion? Is it better
t safeguarding core-commercial banking functions?
It is not obvious that a more fragmented system would be
ess susceptible to contagion, but the record of consolidated
ystems is not convincing either. Systemic risk does not appear
o be contained in large diversified banks. As a matter of
act, Richardson et al. (2010) conclude that “the expansion
o multiple functions – the LCFI (large, complex financial
nstitution) model – produces greater systematic risk.” They
uild this conclusion on extensive work by (among others)
tiroh (2006), De Jonghe (2010), and theoretical work by
agner (2010). So from a policy perspective it is hard to defend
47 The Act is broader. It seeks to expand these measures to other impor-
ant financial institutions (not just banks) and also seeks to address financial
erivatives.
48 The other noteworthy regulatory development was the repeal in 1994 of
he McFadden Act (with the passing of the Riegel-Neal Interstate Branching
fficiency Act) which removed restrictions on interstate branching.
49 For an early discussion on timely intervention and its interaction with sys-
emic concerns, see Wall (2003).
c
d
f
r
d
s
9
e
cnt Finance 1 (2011) 167–183
he necessity of such large and complex institutions. Likewise,
ore limited commercial banking institutions without much
xposure to the financial markets and primarily financed by
eposits (contrary to less stable wholesale financing) might be
etter at safeguarding core-commercial banking functions.
.3. What to do?
We would be in favor of actions that would simplify the
tructure of banking institutions. With the enormous complex-
ty of existing institutions and the difficulty that regulators (and
egislators) have in grasping the intralinkages (within) and inter-
inkages (across) financial institutions, much could be gained.
owever, the same complexity together with the (understand-
bly) hostile and uncooperative attitude of the industry itself
hen it comes to structural measures, make it a truly daunting
ask that would require enormous perseverance and persistence.
lso, well known problems like how to deal with the cross
order operations of banks (international coordination) and the
hadow banking system at large would need to be addressed.
nd what does not help either is that there are no well estab-
ished prescriptions on how to go about redesigning the financial
rchitecture.
The Volcker Rule with its focus on proprietary trading, invest-
ents and sponsorship in hedge funds and private equity, and
ome restrictions on derivatives trading could help reduce the
xposure to financial markets and does seem consistent with the
ual lessons of the crisis as stated above (limit contagion and
rotect core banking functions). But the Rule is clearly impre-
ise and not watertight, so its effectiveness might be limited.
lso the impact on complexity is limited, and hence effective
imely intervention would still be doubtful. But overall we see
t as a move in the right direction.
We believe that heavy handed intervention in the structure of
he banking industry – building on the Volcker Rule – might ulti-
ately be an inevitable part of the restructuring of the industry.
t could address complexity but also help in containing market
orces that might run orthogonal to what prudential concerns
ould dictate (as the insights on market discipline in section
suggest). For now, the structural interventions in the bank-
ng industry are rather tentative. Other measures such as higher
apital and liquidity requirements are clearly needed. But these
rimarily focus on individual institutions while a more system-
rientation is crucial to identify externalities and interlinkages
Goodhart, 2009; Calomiris, 2009). Anti-cyclical capital sur-
harges and other measures and surcharges depending on the
egree of interconnectedness are needed as well to add some
urther comfort. We tend to subscribe to Kay’s (2010) notion of
edundancy: having comfort in the stability of the financial sector
ictates building redundancy into the regulatory and supervisory
tructures of banking.
. ConclusionsThe paper has highlighted the major challenges facing ‘mod-
rn’ banks. What has been shown is that financial innovations
an be good (e.g. from the perspective of completing markets)
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ut could also cause instability. The red flag is related to the
bservation that financial innovations often aim at augmenting
arketability and intertwine banks and financial markets. This
akes banks subject to the boom and bust nature of financial
arkets.
We tend to conclude that the marketability created in bank-
ng via financial innovations has created a more opportunistic
andscape prone to herding, fads and excessive risk taking. More
nstability seems an inherent part of this new reality. Our dis-
ussion on the value of partnerships which actually may contain
nwarranted opportunistic behavior, and their disappearance,
oints at the need to find some new ‘fixed points’ in the financial
ystem; not everything can be fluid.
What we have also argued is that market discipline might be
ather ineffective. We described this as a paradox. When particu-
ar strategies have momentum in financial markets, the market as
whole may underestimate the risks that these entail. How then
an we expect market discipline to work? It appears to us that
arket discipline might not be present when banks follow finan-
ial market inspired strategies. Things are even worse because
hese strategies will lead to a high correlation in actual exposures
etween financial institutions because all see the same oppor-
unities and hence herding occurs. Systemic risk would then be
onsiderable and not checked by market discipline.
What this points at is that market forces work against pru-
ential behavior in banking. Regulation and supervision then
ace an enormous challenge. In part for this reason we believe
hat heavy handed intervention in the structure of the banking
ndustry – building on the Volcker Rule – should ultimately be
n inevitable part of the restructuring of the industry. Structural
easures could help contain destabilizing market forces. The
ther challenge is the complexity of financial institutions. The
omplexity as it exists now makes it very difficult for supervi-
ors to act. Timely intervention seems virtually impossible. The
o-called living wills may lead to some improvements, but more
ransparent business and industry structures seem indispensable.
We do not believe that it is sufficient to only introduce behav-
oral measures like higher capital and liquidity requirements.
hese are undoubtedly needed, including also more system-
riented measures focusing on externalities and interlinkages,
ut they do not address the complexity nor misalignment
etween market forces and prudential concerns. Instructive in
his regard are the counterproductive incentives that higher cap-
tal requirements might induce, e.g. banks might choose to
ncrease their risk exposure following higher capital require-
ents in order to preserve a high ROE (which does not measure
or control for risk).50
We are not convinced by Allen Greenspan’s recent statement
hat we should accept that the financial system is like Adam
mith’s invisible hand – some type of complex eco-system that
s beyond anyone’s control or imagination, and is “unredeemably
50 As noted in section 4, the fallacy of considering the cost of capital more or
ess as fixed at a high level might push banks to manage based on maximizing
he return on equity rather than the risk-adjusted return on equity (and in doing
o, reestablish a high ROE on a now broader equity base).
3
v
g
t
cnt Finance 1 (2011) 167–183 181
paque.”51 Such status quo would seem unacceptable. However,
e is undoubtedly right when he observes that any measure, and
lso the many measures proposed in the Dodd Frank Act, will
ave unintended side effects. This points at the potential costs
f regulatory interference. Indeed, we know very little about the
ost side of regulation (including those of structural measures),
or by the way is it easy to establish the costs of financial crises. A
assive research effort is needed to build an understanding about
hat structure might offer the greatest benefits.52 In our view,
arketability has created considerable instability and warrants
tructural remedies. We are prepared to err on the safe side, and
upport a comprehensive approach to regulation.
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